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THE DISINTEGRATION OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
FRANK E. HORACK JR.*
The problem of giving meaning to and finding meaning
in symbols is universal. Communication and interpretation
are the first requisites of a society. The rules of statutory
interpretation purport to express the judicial custom in this
general social phenomenon. When a judicial decision is
pegged on one rule of interpretation and in a succeeding case
the coftrary result is dictated by a conflicting but equally
authbritarian rule, it is time to recognize that we are deal-
ing neither with "rules" nor with "interpretation," but with
"explanations" of decisions independently determined.
Although concern over rules of interpretation is as old
as our legal system, the great impetus to the use of rules
occurred in the nineteenth century. During that century
the desire for certainty was great. The inherent meaning of
words and of word-position was an easy deduction. Certain-
ty was created where it did not exist. It found political
expression in the resurgence of the theory of a "government
of laws and not of men." Man was the humble servant of
the word.
The doctrine of the separation of powers further built
the chasm between judge and legislator. Decent respect for
the co-ordinate branch of government produced pages of
judicial assertion that "if a law is plain and within the
legislative power it declares itself and nothing is left for in-
terpretation. It is as binding upon the court as upon every
citizen.",
* Professor of Law and Acting Dean, Indiana University School of
Law.
1. State v. Duggan, 15 R. I. 403, 6 Atl. 787 (1886).
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The increase in the work load of all government officers
as well as the division of labor policy of the courts, made
it increasingly difficult -for the judge to know in any inti-
mate way what the legislature was doing. He could not tell
counsel, as did Justice Hengham, "Do not gloss the statute,
for we know better than you, we made it."2 Nevertheless,
the judge was not only obligated to use the statutes, but to
use them to an ever-increasing degree in the determination
of litigation. The formal result of the legislative action was
before him. A decision was necessary. He was responsible
for the result and the explanation; he must respect the
legislature and decide "under the law." To decide under
the law was easy, if he knew what the words of the statute
meant.
3
Two views of "what the law is" have been advanced.
One is that the law of the legislature reposes only in the
words of the statute.4 The other considers the statute only
as the culmination of the legislative process and finds the
law of the legislature in the totality of the legislative func-
tion.5 This disparity of view is not dissimilar to:the contro-
versy over the so-called "law of the case." 6 In both situa-
tions, the test of theory should be its capacity for satisfac-
tory prediction of future decisions.
Although logicallythe determination of what constitutes
the law should control the manner of its interpretation, the
rules as used indicate the process is teleological rather than
logical. 7  Thus, a formalistic treatment of the rules of in-
2. Aumeye v. Anon., Y. B. 33 & 35 Edw. I, 82; or as in Anon. v.
Thomas, Y. B. 32 & 33 Edw. I, 429, "We agreed in Parliament ......
3. Similarly, Holdsworth is supposed to have said, "It is easy to
read the Year Books if you know what the words mean."
4. MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 25 (8th ed. 1937),
Edrich's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 118a (1603); Woodward v. Watts, 2 E. & B.
452 (1853). But it would be misleading to suggest that the English
courts have not considered extrinsic material. See PLUCKNETT, STATUTES
AND THIER INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FQURTEENTH
CENTURY 49-54 (1922).
5. Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U. S. 635 (1930); International
Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50 (1926) and indeed the thou-
sands of cases that reject the doctrine of literal interpretation.
6. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A. B. A. J. 71 (1928);
Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 40(1934); Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis, 33 COL. L. REv. 199 (1933).
7. "I am confirmed in my conviction that the ordinary .interpreta-
tive process' is rather a technical language to set forth a conclusion
than an organon for reaching one." Radin, A Case Study in Statufory
Interpretation, 33 CALIF. L. Rnv. 219 (1945).
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terpretation would scarcely reflect the realism of the judicial
process-that the so-called rules of construction are not rules
of law but rules of explanation.
Excluding decisions which deny the necessity of interpre-
tation8 and those which involve constitutional issues9 the
rules fall into three general classes:
(1) Rules which purport to derive meaning from the
words of the statute itself.
(2) Rules which purport to gain meaning from ex-
trinsic sources.
(3) Rules in the nature of presumptions.
Literal Interpretation. Rules of the first class are gen-
erally known as rules of literal interpretation. They postu-
late that the meaning of the statute can be determined from
the words of the statute and from nothing more. Unless
there is intrinsic meaning in symbols, this. class of rules is
clearly founded upon a false postulate. Or alternatively it
uses, the word "literal" as a symbol to mean words will be
given their common meaning and one who uses them differ-
ently must disclose the difference or be bound by the common
parlance of the society in which the words are used. 0 This
latter explanation though denying the postulate upon which
the rules are usually justified seems to place a sensible obli-
gation upon the legislative draftsman. Even though words
have no intrinsic meaning it is fair to impose reasonable
uniformity in the use of symbols or otherwise the art of com-
munication must surely fail. Thus, unless there is dis-
closure of special usage, the receiver of a symbol may use
it in its "generally accepted" sense, with confidence that it
had been so understood by the giver.11 If this were not true
we would all live in the anarchy of Babel.
8. Obviously the denial of the necessity of interpretation is itself
interpretation-that the statute means what the judge believes it to
mean when he applies or refuses to apply it to the case before him.
9. The void-for-vagueness rule is clearly interpretation carried to
the level of extraconstitutional bases for unconstitutionality. See
Winters v.,New York, 333- U. S. 507 (1948); United States v. Cohen
Grocery, Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1920) ; Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U. S. 385 (1926).
10. Even this of course does not provide an absolute standard, and
should not. -The language level of a corporation act or a medical regula-
tion act should be directed to those from whom compliance is expected,
in the case of statutes of general application to the "simple under-
standing of the pater farilias."
11. "The use of common experience as a glossary is necessary to
meet the practical demands of legislation." Cardozo, J., in Sproles v.
Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 393 (1932).
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Thus, in most communication, interpretation is auto-
matic, and giver and receiver achieve "understanding" im-
mediately. Litigation, however, presents additional problems
and as Gray soundly cautioned, the obligation of the statutory
draftsman is not to write so that he can be understood, but
to draft so that he cannot be misunderstood. Courts
should recognize the disputatious tendencies of counsel and
ignore the temptation to phrase opinions in terms of literal
interpretation; for, when the challenge to meaning is ser-
ious and it is "reasonably apparent" that the meaning differs
from that normally ascribed to the symbol, it should be
equally certain that the decision cannot rest upon the words
of the statute alone.
Literal interpretation is delusive and meaningless. State-
ments that the statute is clear and unambiguous in no way
disclose the source from which or manner in which meaning
is derived. Such statements are merely complicated explana-
tions of the court's satisfaction with the result it reaches
reading the statute as it reads it. Only the holding of the
court makes the statute more determinate. This, of course,
gives practical meaning to the symbols involved; but the
meaning comes from the judgment and not from the asser-
tion that the statute is clear.
The insufficiency of literal interpretation is frequently
emphasized by courts cautioning that "It is always an un-
safe way of construing a statute or contract to diyide it, by
a process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and
then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some
particular definition. ' 12 It is not only unsafe, it is not sensi-
ble. None of us speak in single words; our symbolizing in-
volves collective word use and we intend to convey meaning
by the aggregate of our symbols interpreted in the surround-
ings of their use. Interpretation based upon individual words
leads inevitably to the perversion of meaning.
Such rules of literal interpretation, however, exist. The
much-used expressio unius and ejusdem generis rules assume
that particularity is inconsistent with generality, and thus,
statutory enumeration restricts judicial application. This
is inconsistent with human experience. Normally when a
person particularizes and then generalizes his intent is to
12. International Trust Co. v. American Loan & Trust Co., 62
Minn. 501, 65 N. W. 78, 79 (1895).
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include something more than his particulars; otherwise, he
would be making a meaningless addition to an already un-
derstandable term.
The need for both particularization and generalization
in statutes is even more compelling than in non-legal com-
munication. Most people are aroused by particular evils
and then seek to associate other ills of equal kind and degree.
This habit probably accounts for the form of much statutory
drafting and was clearly recognized as a basis for equitable
interpretation. 13  But it is more than a habit of speech.
Statutes are drafted to produce results. The draftsman
knows that his statute is no better than the enforcement that
it gets; thus, he must inform the enforcing personnel in
terms that will produce action. What better way is there
than to particularize and then say "in all other similar
cases" act the same way. Yet, if this is what he says, he
incurs the risk that in its judicial administration the statute
will be limited in its application to the particulars.
Admittedly it is impossible to determine exactly how
another expresses his thoughts in words. It is reasonable
to assume, however, that expression may be tested by ob-
jective standards not unlike those used to determine the in-
tention of the parties in contract,14 but it is certain that word
position alone is not a sufficient test, particularly when the
formulated rule is contrary to the normal custom of word
usage. Typically ejusdem generis discloses the impossibility
of literal interpretation. The meaning of word position comes
not from the words or the position but from the custom of
the society and to determine this the interpretation must be-
come extrinsic. Fortunately, the maxim of ejusdem generis
is not a compelling rule and as frequently as it is applied
it is ignored or rejected.1" Thus, most statutes escape the
fate that threatens them all; but unfortunate is the drafts-
man who must always face that fate or pay the cost of un-
guided enforcement.
The "and/or" rule, noscitur a sociis, and reddendo
singula singulis are but a few of the many other applica-
13. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law in HARvAnD LEGAL
EssAYs 213 (1934).
14. Admitting of course that the "objective test" must nevertheless
be something less than "objective."
15. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§ 4909-4914 (Hor-
ack's ed. 1943).
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tions of the rule of literalness. All assume judgment limited
to the four corners of the statute. Yet the very process of
judging implies the application of what the judge considers
the common usage of meaning and grammar. This does not
mean that the judge seeks to decide issues of policy; it means
only that he must apply words as he understands them. But
this is something besides intrinsic-literal interpretation. It
would be more accurate to describe the process as extrinsic
interpretation measured by common usage or as presumptions
restricting the area of effective legal expression. To say
that the meaning comes from the statute alone, always has
and always will be contrary to the fact.
Extrinsic Interpretation. Once it is admitted that words
have no inherent meaning, then any system of literal or con-
textual interpretation imposes a judicial standard of objec-
tive expression upon the legislature. In this sense Radin
is correct in postulating that there is no "discovery of legisla-
tive intention" but merely a judicial declaration of appli-
cability of the statute. 6 But "legislative intention" is also
a symbol capable of carrying an infinite variety of meanings.
One Supreme Court Justice says, for example, that he never
uses the word "intention" and, of course, never considers
"motive." 17  But he uses "purpose" and "policy." This
means only that he believes that "intention" and "motive"
are bad words and that "purpose" and "policy" are good ones.
Radin pointed out effectively the fictional character of
"legislative intention" but recognized the necessity of con-
sidering something more than the statute itself in determin-
ing its applicability to particular cds6.S8 - This, too, may be
little more than expressing preference for particular symbols.
"Legislative intention" is useful as a symbol to express
the gloss which surrounds the enacting process-the pre-
legislative history, the circumstances and motivations which
induced enactment. 19 Legislative intention thus described
becomes a rule of relevancy. Time and the necessity for
decision limit the capacity of inquiry into all the possible
16. Radin, Statutory Construction, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870
(1930).
17. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on Reading the Statutes, 47
COL. L. REV. 527, 538 (1947).
18. Radin, supra note 16, at 872.
19. See Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REv.
41 (1937).
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data relevant to any given social phenomenon. Termination
of inquiry is inevitable in all investigation, and the concept
of legislative intention is merely a guide to the kind of source
material which seems relevant to the meaning of the statute.
20
It is an objective standard similar to that discussed under lit-
eral interpretation-it merely recognizes a wider scope of in-
quiry. Society cannot act effectively on subjectivity of intent;
and, therefore, legislative intention becomes not what the leg-
islature in fact intended but rather what reliable evidences
there are to satisfy the need for further understanding of the
legislative action.
The use of extrinsic materials in the interpretation of
statutes by the Supreme Court of the United States has been
a standard practice. Fortunately it has seldom felt the
necessity of defending their use by the repetition of formal-
istic rules of interpretation. 21  Its opinions show that the
meaning of the statute cannot come from the statutory words
alone. Unfortunately, its lead has not found ready accept-
ance among the state courts. This is at least in part attri-
butable to the failure of state legislatures to make available
reliable records of committee hearings and reports, legisla-
tive memoranda, and the like.22 Further, the federal docket,
except for the constitutional cases, is so exclusively statutory
that the only source of authority is the statutory material
itself. This is also true in ever-increasing areas of state
litigation where many contemporary statutes deal with areas
alien to common law experience, but this is not well recog-
nized by either bench or bar in the states.
Extrinsic materials, however, are not goals in themselves
any more than the statutes. They, too, consist merely of
symbols and as such are subject to interpretation and differ-
ence.22  Their value lies exclusively in the increase of infor-
mation which they provide on the question in issue.
20. Obviously the inquiry must extend to non-legislative sources.
See Radin, supra note 16; United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379,
389 (1946).
21. Although problems of interpretation involve a larger portion of
the Supreme Court's time than they do of state courts the paucity of
Supreme Court citations in the standard search books in comparison
with state cases is a demonstration of the general abandonment of these
rules.
22. The Massachusetts Document Series, is a notable exception.
For other improved state document series see Finley, Book Review, 24
IND. L. J. 328, 330 (1949).
23. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1916).
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The use of the extrinsic aid does not provide certainty
but rather admits of the postulate that meaning is a devious
thing and that all reliable sources from which meaning .can
be abstracted are appropriate for interpretation. If this is
true, then there is no need for the citation of common rules
purporting to justify the use of extrinsic materials. Judi-
cial opinions can direct themselves to the reliability, the im-
plications, the arguments contained in these materials, and
the materials will fit into the judicial process in a way not
unlike the use of case authority.
Modern opinions direct little if any attention to rules
governing "precedent" and the acceptability of a case for
judicial consideration. The argument centers on the propriety
of the particular decision as relevant to the case at issue. Sim-
ilar treatment of legislative material seems justified. In other
words propriety should be framed in terms of relevancy and
reliability, not in terms of formal rules of literal versus
extrinsic interpretation.
In those areas where statutory materials have become
deeply ingrained in judicial consciousness this same result
has occurred. For example, courts in cases under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the Income Tax Act, the Interstate Commerce Act,
and (in the states) cases involving the Criminal Code,
the Statute of Wills, 24 and the Statute of Frauds find little
need for rules of interpretation because the judges have con-
fidence gained from a familiarity with the legislation, and
the statute law takes its proper place in the judicial process.
When this result has been achieved statutory interpre-
tation will not be dead, it will merely have advanced beyond
the structural formalities of explaining by meaningless rules
a court's conclusions as to statutory meaning, and will deal
with the value of the materials from which the meaning is
derived. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States have demonstrated in recent years that a court can
operate satisfactorily without these structural crutches.
Fictitious Interpretation. Rules of interpretation in the
nature of presumptions are the hardest with which to deal.
They are fictional rules of interpretation and frequently lead
to results exactly opposite those which legislatures intend.
At best they are judicial standards requiring a particular
form of legislative expression. As such, they are within
24. Bordwell, The Statute of Wills, 14 IowA L. Rsv. 1 (1928).
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limits defensible. Every system of government depends
upon the ability of society to require of its people certain
formalities as prerequisite to legal consequence. It is not
too much to require this of the agencies of government as
well. Formalities, however, become intolerable when they
no longer reflect the normal expectations of the society for
which they were constructed. To test thus the rules of pre-
sumed intention discloses that they are altogether unsatis-
factory. The rule of strict construction of penal statutes is
a case in point. The origin of the rule was clearly a policy
attempt of the British courts to adjust the criminal laws to
the society when Parliament still insisted on "making the
punishment fit the crime." This rule also reflects our basic
suspicion of governmental action. The prosecutor must prove
his case beyond a reasonable doubt, not only on the facts,
but also on the statute. If men are presumed to know the
law, they are apparently only supposed to know the law
which men of ordinary capacity find knowable.25 Fiction is
25. In Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948), the Court held
that a New York statute regulating the sale of publications "principally
made up of criminal news ... or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or
crime," was invalid as being too indefinite to inform booksellers when
their conduct came within the statute. Under this view the Four-
teenth Amendment might be invoked to invalidate a number of criminal
statutes the standards of which are equally uncertain. E.g., N. Y.
PENAL LAW, § 1290: "... Hereafter it shall be immaterial in, and no
defense to, a prosecution for larceny that: .. . the purpose for which
the owner was induced to part with .. . such property was immoral
or unworthy"; N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 1030: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to engage in or aid or abet what is commonly called hazing, in
or while attending any of the colleges, public schools or other institu-
tions of learning in this state... "; N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 700: "All
persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.
No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected
to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person . .. or by
the state.. ."; N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 421: "Any person . . .who, with
intent to sell or in any way dispose of merchandise ... to the public...
with intent to increase the consumption thereof . . . publishes . . . in
a newspaper . . . an advertisement . . . or statement of any sort re-
garding merchandise .. .which advertisement contains any assertion,
representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or mis-
leading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."; N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 1342:
11... [Defense to libel] The publication is justified when the mater
charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and forjustifiable ends." [Italics supplied.)
Statutes similar to that in the Winters case which may be invali--
dated by that decision are collated by Frankfurter, J., in his dissent.
Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 522 (1948). Among those statutes
which are "somewhat similar, but may not necessarily be rendered
unconstitutional" he lists IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 10-2805:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale, or to
print or publish, or to bring into this state for the purpose of selling,
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compounded upon fiction. The legislative purpose or object
or intent is lost sight of completely. Strict construction
drives regulation and sanction from the judicial to the ad-
ministrative level, if results are to be obtained, and then
casts doubt upon the validity of the administrative sanction.
Certainly the rule of strict construction cannot support
the decision in United States v. Sheridan26 yet one can hardly
doubt the practicality of the result or conjure up bases of un-
fairness to the accused. Further, "strict construction"
would not have been consonant with the intent of Congress.2 7
Nor is there apparent reason why the search for meaning
should be different in a case like Sheridan than in United
States v. Ruizicka,28 where the Court appropriately observed
that "meaning, though not explicitly stated in words, may
be imbedded in a coherent scheme."'2'
Originally, strict construction found no place in the
law of interpretation. Lord Coke correctly pointed out that
the search for meaning should apply to all statutes "be they
penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common
law.' ' 30 This properly emphasizes that policy should not be
confused with the determination of meaning. The policy of
extending protection to some defendants may be sound but
it should not be justified as a matter of legislative meaning.
Even where an act cannot be described as penal, the
giving away or otherwise disposing of, or to circulate in any way, any
paper, book, or periodical the chief feature or characteristic of which
is the record of commission of crime or the display by cut or illustra-
tion of crimes committed or of the acts or pictures of criminals, des-
peradoes, or of men or women in lewd and unbecoming positions or im-
proper dress. . . ." [Italics supplied.]
26. 329 U. S. 379 (1946). Sheridan negotiated forged checks in
Michigan, which were then forwarded to the drawee bank in Missouri.
The defendant maintained, among other defenses, that he had not
"caused" the transportation of the checks in interstate commerce within
the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act, which provides "...
whoever shall transport or cause to be transported in interstate . . .
commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities,
knowing the same to have been falsely made . . . shall be punished
." The Court found the defendant's act to be within the terms of
the statute.
27. See note 20 supra.
28. 329 U. S. 287 (1946). The Court held that the statutory de-
sign of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act compelled milk
handlers to pursue an appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture from
administrative orders. Where this procedure had not been followed, the
validity of the order could not be tested in a judicial proceeding brought
by the Government to enforce the contribution.
29. Id. at 292.
80. 3 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584).
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risk of restrictive presumption is present. In a sense every
statute, with the exception of declaratory statutes, alters the
common law-either directly or by entering fields previously
free of common law regulation. Thus, all statutes potentially
may be strictly construed because they are in derogation of
the common law. But to presume that the legislature did
not intend to change the common law usually is directly con-
trary to the fact and often is in contradiction to specific
legislative rejection of the rule.31 Realistic acceptance of
the situation induced the Minnesota Supreme Court very
properly to declare: "We do not consider ourselves at liberty
to apply any rule of 'strict construction' to this or any other
statute simply because it happens to be in derogation of
common law. . . . Too much judicial indulgence in 'strict
construction' of statutes has heretofore disguised 'extracon-
stitutional obstacles to, or hindrances of, legislative pur-
pose .... ,32
"Extraconstitutional obstacles" is an excellent euphem-
ism for judicial usurpation of legislative policy making-a
usurpation unjustified under our constitutional system even
though judges may think that they know better than legisla-
tors what the people desire or what is good for them.
Numerous other rules of presumption serve the func-
tion of shifting policy determination from the legislature
to the court. For example, after what appeared to have been
a decent burial, 33 the rule of derogation of sovereignty has
appeared again in all its unfortunate vigor in the Lewis
case." The weak strands of the majority's legislative his-
tory are not strengthened by the assertion that "There is
an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general
terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be ap-
plied to the sovereign without express words to that effect."33
For as Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out "The issue is not
31. Approximately one-third of the states have adopted general
statutes concerning construction in which this rule is expressly rejected.
3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6205 (Horack's ed. 1943).
32. Teders v. Rothermel, 205 Minn. 470, 472, 286 N. W. 353, 354
(1939).
33. United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936); Nardone v.
United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937);- and in the case of government
agencies, Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S.
381 (1939); Federal Housing Adm'r. v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1940).
34. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 (1947).
35. Id. at 272.
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avoided, nor is the effect of final legislative rejection nulli-
fied, by the easy device of resting the power . . . upon com-
mon law rules of statutory construction"'3--rules "vague,
conveniently selective and often, as here, contradictory .... ,,37
Legislatures seldom give helpful information concern-
ing the applicability to the sovereign of a specific statute or of
the whole body of statutes and common law.38 To say that be-
cause the legislature has not considered the question, it has
decided it, is both fictitious and illogical. To say when the
legislature has determined the question, as it did in the
Lewis case, that because the language of the statute was not'
explicit the legislature had not decided the question discloses
the rule for what it is-a limitation on legislative power-
an "extraconstitutional obstacle."
Although presumptions limiting statutory operation are
the more common, some presumptions extend statutory ap-
plication. These rules announce that "liberal construction"
is to be given to remedial and beneficial legislation, grants
for public purposes, public welfare statutes, and emergency
legislation."9  But why "liberal construction"? No greater
reason justifies artificial determination of meaning in favor
of the statute than against it.
The function of the court is to determine from relevant
sources how the statute was intended to operate and to apply
it in that manner. The beneficial statutes restrict rights
and increase duties upon those against whom the statute is
directed. For those persons the statute is not. beneficial.
They are entitled to have the statute applied as the legisla-
ture intended-neither restricted nor expanded.
After this hasty survey of some of the rules of construc-
tion it is easy to conclude that there is little that is defensible
in either literal 'interpretation or in the rules of presumption.
There is little left of "rule" in the maxims of extrinsic in-
terpretation. They merely announce the fact that courts on
occasion go beyond the statute to determine its meaning. As
rules they do not give reliable guidance as to where, when,
36. Id. at 344 n.4. P
37. Id. at 349 n.11.
38. The question which majority and minority assumed in Federal
Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380 (1947), Note, Legal
Responsibility of Federal Agencies, 24 IND. L. J. 427 "(1949).
39. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRuCTION §§ 5701, 6406, 7201-
7216 (Horack's ed. 1943).
[Vol. 24346
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or how far beyond the statute the inquiry may go. They are
not exclusionary rules of evidence, and, thus, as maxims are
useless.
Where does all this leave us? Judges Frank" and Frank-
furter 41 have said that statutory interpretation cannot be re-
duced to rule, that it is an Art. This is unsatisfactory.
Granted that psychology has been unable to analyze and de-
scribe the act of judgment and that the interpretation of a
statute is, as is every other judicial determination, an act of
judgment, still we are entitled to a more concrete answer
than "It is an Art."
Statutory construction ha more than judicial conse-
quences. Obviously, every judicial decision has effect beyond
the immediate litigants involved. Lawyers advise clients on
the basis of court decisions. Transactions are entered into
on the assumption that former decisions in the same field will
have future application. Decisions founded on statutory
interpretation have wide import. Not only do they serve as
a guide for future litigation and counseling, but they
become guides for future statutory drafting, both in the area
of the decision, and in many other fields as well.
If courts believe, as they say, that legislatures are pre-
sumed to know of past judicial decisions and that statutes
are drafted with a knowledge of them, they must recognize
that they have given legislative draftsmen poor guides for
future action. ,To be sure, the draftsman knows that if his
statute is held to be penal it will be strictly construed, while
if it is considered to be remedial the interpretation will be
"liberal"; that if he uses enumeration he must face the rule
of ejusdem generis; while if he uses words of general import
the statute may be "void for vagueness." But he does not
know when the court will determine that one set of rules
is applicable and when the other. For him the rules of
statutory construction are at best, meaningless; at worst,
they are unseen and "extraconstitutional obstacles" that he
must avoid if possible.
Critical as we may be of the courts, it must also be
40. Frank, Words and Music: Some Reflections on Statutory In-
terpretation, 47 CoL. L. REV. 1258 (1947).
41. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COL. L. REv. 527 (1947). For Justice Frankfurter's view of the in-
terpretative process see Wolfson, Book Review, 23 IND. L, J. 381 (1948).
42. See note 9 supra.
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recognized that legislative draftsmen have obligations to
provide statutes capable of judicial administration. It is ob-
vious that draftsmen have not always discharged this re-
sponsibility. Legislatures like courts have tended to accept
the validity of word symbols and to provide courts with noth-
ing but the "literal words" of the statute. Only Congress and
three or four state legislatures publish permanent records
of their committee hearings, reports, and legislative memor-
anda. Not until all state legislatures make data of this char-
acter regularly available and published in usable form can
bench and bar be expected to give adequate treatment to the
interpretative process.
Assuming that these materials become generally avail-
able what should be the general character of "rules of in-
terpretation"? Rules of literal interpretation should be
abandoned and the court should consider the statute with all
relevant material for the understanding of the statute. To
do otherwise gives undue significance to the accidental use
and understanding of words.
Assume the abandonment of rules of literal interpreta-
tion. Where then would the court turn? To extrinsic mate-
rials? Yes, but without all the structural rules which pur-
port to justify the use of committee reports, statements of
the floor manager, and the like. These rules have served for
statutory construction the function that the maxims of equity
served for the Chancellor. But just as courts of equity
found that the substitution of the maxims hid but did not pre-
vent uncontrolled discretion, so for statutory interpretation.
Few lawyers believe, today, that the citation of a maxim of
equity will decide a case and few courts suppose that their
citation is sufficient explanation of result. This does not
mean that the decision of a case in equity is an art or that
it is the uncontrolled or arbitrary result of the judges' prefer-
ences. Room for judicial choice there is, and always will
be; the finding of new relevance in old symbols merely em-
phasizes that judicial choice will be made by factors more
complex and more subtle than can ever be expressed in a
single maxim. The result has been that both court and
counsel have inquired more thoroughly into the merits of
each case and the consequence of the decision. They have
thus abandoned reliance on formal logic and the intra-con-
pistencies of the opinion,
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If the development of statutory construction can follow
a similar pattern, and there is no reason why it cannot, then
the role of the court in the legislative process can more
easily be analyzed and understood. It is the tradition of the
judiciary to express their judgments wherever possible in
terms of prior authority. When they engage in this process
they indulge in no formal talk about interpreting the prior
case; they do not say that it is ejusdem generis or in pari
materia. The court merely declares what it meant in its
prior decision. Because the decision was the court's own
child it does not hesitate to speak for it; only because it is
aware that a statute was the offspring of others does it feel
the necessity for explanation.
In the twenty-odd years since Cardozo wrote The Nature
of the Judicial Process much false mysticism has been
abandoned. It is recognized today that precedent has its
place and that likewise society is entitled to progress. Where
the two claims collide the court or the legislature each in
its own way must iaccept the responsibility for decision.43
In the area of statutory construction, courts have been
hesitant to acknowledge a similar flexibility in the judicial
process. Faith still is put in the old rules in the belief that
they will strain out the human side of the judge and bar con-
siderations of policy which must forever motivate to greater
or lesser degree what appears to be the "fitness" of an
answer. Nevertheless, everyone is fully aware that the rules
of interpretation are not rules of law, or of grammar, or of
semantics, or even of policy. They are explanations and
apologies which, historically, we have accepted as the proper
verbalizings to accompany a result where, though the judge
speaks last, court, administrator, and legislature must co-
operate if intelligent social standards are to be maintained.
If this is the goal, then surely all relevant material re-
gardless of origin is appropriate authority for decision. Just
as in the selection of case authority, we must place confidence
in the courts to select authority which a majority will con-
sider convincing. The fact that the material is legislative,
administrative, or even non-governmental should need no ex-
planation so long as by tests of relevance it illuminates the
43. But neither their ways nor their methods are as diverse as
might be expected. Cohen, On the Teaching of 'Legislation', 47 COL. L.
REv. 1301 (1947).
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problem which the legislature was considering and con-
tributes to the substance of the ultimate legislative decision.
44
If such a test can be accepted, then there is no need for a dif-
ferent approach to statutory questions than to others; the
raw materials of decision will be the same, altered only by
the issue in litigation.45
44. Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & Steamship Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 503
(1949), illustrates the kind of material which may be resorted to in
a difficult case. In an action brought by an employee under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the Court
was confronted with delimiting the "disability" incurred by an employee
who, having lost the sight of one eye through a non-industrial cause,
loses his other eye in an industrial accident. The Court, rejecting the
suggestion that the word "disability" had been used as a term of art,
refused to apply the statutory definition in a mechanical fashion. It
employed Subcommittee Hearings, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulle-
tins, and particularly administrative practice under the New York
statute (on which the federal act was said to be based) in the con-
struction of the statute. Cf. Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U. S. 635
(1930); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 7206 (Horack's ed.
1943); Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213 (1934).
The Court feels free on other occasions to .reject materials equally
persuasive. Thus, in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 69 Sup. Ct. 140
(1948), the Court found, in a suit brought by an employee under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, that the Act applied to a Bermuda naval
base. This holding was in the face of the strongest possible urging by
the executive branch that such a decision would have dire consequences
for our foreign relations and would be contrary to administrative in-
terpretation. "While the general purpose of the Congress in the enact-
ment of the Fair Labor Standards Act is clear no such definite indica-
tion of the purpose to include leased areas, such as the Bermuda base
in the word "possession" appears. We cannot even say, 'we see what
you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall
go on as before.' Under such circumstances, our duty as a Court is
to construe the word 'possession' as our judgment instructs us the law-
makers, within constitutional limits, would have done had they acted
at the time of the legislation with the present situation in mind." Reed,
J., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 69 Sup. Ct. at 146. See Fuchs,
Administrative Determinations and Personal Rights in the Present
Supreme Court, 24 IND. L. J. 163-166 (1949).
But surprisingly, in an opinion also written by Mr. Justice Reed
in the current Term the Court held that the Eight Hour Law does not
apply to a contract between the United States and a private contractor
for construction work in a foreign country. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 69
Sup. Ct. 575 (1949). "The canon of construction which teaches that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the teritorial jurisdiction of the United States . . .
is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be
ascertained. It is based on the assumption that Congress is primarly
concerned with domestic conditions. We find nothing in the Act itself,
as amended, nor in the legislative history, which would lead to the
belief that Congress entertained any intention other than the normal
one in this case. The situation here is different from that in Vermilya-
Brown Co. v. Connell... ." 69 Sup. Ct. at 577.
45. Herein, of the distinction between powers of the court rather
than the interpretative method when the issue is one of constitutionality
instead of statutory interpretation. See Horack, Congressional Silence:
A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEX. L. REv. 247 (1947).
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If rules of interpretation are of intense concern to the
draftsman as well as to litigants then there is still to be dis-
posed of the desirability of rules of presumption-in other
words, norms of expression that courts may reasonably re-
quire of legislatures. Although it would appear that the
search for meaning and truth should rise above mere form
alone, the merit of certainty bulks large in favor of a sys-
tem of presumptions. Unfortunately, however, when pre-
sumptions have been tried they have failed.
After numerous statutes had been declared unenforcible
because some section was unconstitutional and after Justice
Brandeis had suggested that if the statute had expressed
such an intention the provisions were severable, the rule be-
came general that the judicial respect for another branch of
government required that so much of the act as was valid
be enforced. The severability clause operated to rebut the
presumption that the legislature intended the act to operate
as a whole.46 Consequently, it became customary to append
severability clauses, indeed, so customary that almost every
statute, even those with but a single section, contained such
a clause. In the end the presumption failed for courts said
the mere inclusion of the clause was not indicative of a
legislative intent that the statute be severable. 47 As a result,
the draftsman is in a worse position than before: If he leaves
the section out he implies non-severability; if he puts it in
the court can disregard it as insufficient evidence of legisla-
tive intent. The best the draftsman can do is to draft the
section in some unusual form in the hope that a court will
consider (inappropriately) that the unusual wording is indi-
cative of special legislative consideration.
The suggestion that statutes be literally construed
and that nothing be taken by intendment appears attrac-
tive until it is recognized that the rules of presumption are
multiple and provide no greater certainty than the usual
maxims of interpretation. What is needed in statutory
construction is not more rules but fewer. Until the
46. Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 (1924) (but the court
warned that the clause "is an aid merely; not an inexorable com-
mand."); Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 278 U. S. 235
(1929).
47. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932); Rail-
road Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
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propriety and necessity of extrinsic material is truly recog-
nized, the law of statutory construction will continue to fill
the opinions with meaningless apologies for decisions the
rules never dictated. The rules will multiply as each new
problem requires a new answer and another escape from
an old rule.
When once it is accepted that the process of interpreta-
tion is normal and inescapable and that the court must decide
from such sources as are relevant, it can be hoped that
legislatures will provide adequate sources of interpretation
and that the courts will use them without explanation or
apology. The test of the decisions will not change: the pro-
fession will judge the judicial skills; the public will judge
the social results.
